INheRITaNce
Inheritance may be the single most influential cause of inequality. Thomas Piketty has tracked European inheritance in the past century and a half, and he found that inheritance has played a fundamental role in economic inequality. In fact, he suggests that the US American percentage of wealth derived from inheritance, if it was known, could be anywhere between 20% and 60%, given from the range of informed estimates available.
Hence, a simple remedy balances inequality: cap inheritance. Certainly, people should be able to pass on personal objects, a family home up to a certain value, money, and even valuable artworks that are part of a family history. However, there ought to be a clear line: a line that is not well described by current inheritance taxes in North America or Europe. No one ought to inherit a fortune. No one requires to be given a palace at one's start of life. The wishes of a person should mostly end with his or her death, with the exception of charitable funds that are for the well-being of many others and that are interpreted through living interprets of the will. Whereas it is laudable people wish their children and families to do well after their death, this should never reach a level that produces a generation beyond needs and the drive to become a productive part of society. In our current world, ghosts from the past centuries still rule.
Not only would the measure to cap inheritance change actual distribution, it could also change the rhetoric of inequality. Piketty suggests that inheritance of wealth not only leads to the increasing inequality but it is also used to justify inequality:
In 1881, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu … vigorously defended the high civil servants of his day […] . these were figures that might seem enormous to the common man but actually make it impossible to live with elegance or amass savings of any size. 1 Similarly, the exorbitant incomes of top managers and stock brokers today are often justified, as Picketty points out, by the notion that they need to amass enough income to equal rich heirs of large fortunes, whose money they invest.
What is interesting about this argument is its circularity. The existence of large fortunes and of large heritages is used to justify huge salaries for a few. This allows these few to amass the next exorbitant fortune, which then justifies the next generation of stockbrokers to earn excessive salaries to match these nouveaux riches.
Inheritance of fortunes may thus be at the root of economic inequality by constituting, perpetuating, and justifying it. Currently, a few inherit fortunes that raise them out of the pool of the workforce. In many cases, they never experienced hardships of their parents' hard work that could perhaps justify the reward since their parents already profited from inheritance themselves.
So why do "we, the people" tolerate this injustice and accept it? Or put differently, why is my agenda a non-starter? Why is no one listening? The problem of scarcity is a temporal-factual-social problem, as we all know. Whatever the "natural" conditions may be: the problem arises when someone with interests in his future in mind excludes others from access to resources. The question is: When and how is he allowed to do so? The answer offered by money as the medium of communication is: when he pays. (252) The more fundamental question is: Under which circumstances others […] accept it that someone reaches for scarce resources. One person acts, the others watch and remain quiet, even though they are also interested. No one will accuse Luhmann of being a leftist thinker. Nevertheless, as a sociologist, he wonders how and why societies accept inequality. In particular, he muses over the fact that monetary interaction somehow pacifies people. And even more curiously for Luhmann, he does not fully answer his own question. Though after twenty pages of back and forth, he points to religion as the final peacemaker that tames revolutions against inequality.
The QuesTIoN
This paper wishes to take up Luhmann's question and address why most people in democracies tolerate economic inequality. Why do people not demand equality or a less stringent inequality in companies where the CEO earns some hundred times the salary of 50% of the workers?
The following examination will limit the discussion to situations in which economic advantage is not identical with political or military power, as for example, in feudalism. In feudalism, most of the rich are also in possession of actual power as aristocrats and thus cannot be held answerable to their immense wealth.
Our discussion will consider post-feudal societies in which wealth is not identical to actual power. To be sure, it would be naïve to consider the political and economic spheres as completely separate domains or even clearly distinguished practices. For centuries, a new form of government has linked them in such a way that one can identify many sites of fused political-economic knowledge, as Joseph Vogl suggests. 4 Still, it is far from clear that this new fused knowledge always or clearly supports economic inequality.
This fusion of economic and political knowledge also does not explain why those who are mostly excluded from power and high wealth, but are part of the people, tolerate the super wealth of others and remain, in Luhmann's words, "quiet." What is the source of complacency?
In the following, we will briefly sketch possible answers and then focus on an argument outlined by Georg Simmel in his monumental Philosophie des Geldes [Philosophy of Money] . Could it be that money itself makes the question of equality invisible, silent, almost impossible?
Red heRRINgs
What are possible responses to the question why people are willing to accept economic inequality? Lets consider a few possible answers to our question. 1) There is a human bias toward preserving the status quo and viewing it as the natural state of being. If inequality exists and grows slowly, people are likely to see it as "the way things are." People may also resist change and topdown efforts to control the "invisible hand." 3) Religion and its cultural effects may play a role both in preventing people from making demands (especially by resorting to violence) or expecting equality in this life when there is a promise of a better afterlife. 4) The case can be made that notions of selfhood are intrinsically entangled with notions of ownership or economic growth. Hence, critiquing capital and inequality seems to equal an attack on the individual. 8 5) People with money have more potential of influence and can protect their interests in many ways and with the help of many institutions, such as the police and propaganda.
9 They also simply have access to better financial knowledge and can obtain better education. Hence, accepting inequality could be ingrained into the education and policing of society. 6) In a land of opportunity, the myth can rule that people who make more money deserve it. They are better, smarter, work harder, and take on more responsibility.
10 (To be sure, this idea would be contradicted by inheritance. Someone embracing this philosophy should consequently also oppose inheriting).
7) It is also possible that people do not know or mentally downplay actual inequality, and therefore avoid the need to action.
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Each of these answers has its merits and probably correctly names a tendency that explains some aspects of the acceptance of inequality. However, these answers are also wanting since each of these arguments could be also be made for unequal political power. However, as we have seen historically, people have shown less regard toward political inequality in the past three centuries. And while these answers would point toward some possible inequality, they can hardly account for economic inequalities of the scale that Cambridge University Press, 2013).
It should also be mentioned though that Piketty records that people today living in poverty had at least one year with an exceptionally high income with a 30% likelihood. 7 This is the direction that Karl Marx points to when he calls religion as "opium of the people" (for a reading of the context of this citation, see Andrew M. people tolerate tacitly in most Western democracies nor for inequalities that are based on inheritance. In other words, it is not clear whether these potential answers can account for complacency in the twenty-first century.
QuesTIoN aNd aNsWeR
It is interesting to note that our concern comes in form of a question or demand of equality. The mere question why some are rich and others are not should lead to difficult justifications, for example of inheritance. Can it even be justified? How is it possible not to reply to a demand of justification or a question? How can a question remain unanswered? How can a question be suppressed to not rise as a question? This is puzzling. On the most fundamental level, we are a social and conversing species. Our human intelligence may be a result of social intelligence, of communicating, gossiping, and sharing social chitchat. We ask questions, we get answers. This is a deep ritual of our civilization: that we expect to receive an answer when we ask a question. In fact, we often anticipate the question and reply as if we needed to do so.
Issues of morality are strong cases of this. We legitimize our actions in front of others and are expected to do so when we are accused of wrongdoing. There are few rituals as strong as the one of question and answer.
12 The justmentioned case of morality may be a particular strong and strongly sanctioned case in which we owe answers. In fact, our term "responsibility" (responsibilité, Verantwortung) derives from "response" (Antwort). Our everyday language is full of clear reminders of the importance to reply. We say: "You owe me an answer." Once there is a question, answers are expected.
Even in cases of power asymmetry, answers can be demanded. An interesting case is the petition to the ruler. Rulers have no obligation to agree to the petitioner. They can dismiss the petition usually with no consequence other than the dissatisfaction of the petitioners -however, they do need to provide a response, even if negative. If they fail to reply, the negative affect of the petitioner grows immensely. Failing to reply has historically led to successful rebellions. 13 It probably still does today. Modern rulers, including CEOs, administrators and university rulers such as deans and provosts, receive many petitions-and are expected to reply. Rulers usually can afford to reply negatively, but they cannot afford to ignore the question by not replying.
How can one deny a reply to the call for equality or the demand to justify inequality? Luhmann's above dictum provides a clue: An answer can be denied by giving an answer. Why does someone own more than others? Because she can pay for it. Of course, the answer here is both an answer and no answer. It is a true answer with correct causality, but its tautological nature also denies an answer of how someone comes into the position of being able to pay.
What is it about money that gives the impression that it somehow addresses, answers, and thereby closes and precludes the question of inequality?
geoRg sImmel: moNey as a meaNs of lIBeRaTIoN
The theorist to whom I will turn here is Georg Simmel and his Philosophy of Money (1900 Money ( , 1907 . Simmel observes everyday phenomena connected to money and desire. Among these observations are his considerations of the special status of the rich that will allow us to address our question:
The rich enjoys advantages, far above the actual pleasures that he can buy with his money-there is a sphere of advantage without question around him.
14 It is this sphere of "advantage without question" (fraglose Bevorzugtheit) that is of interest here. In the same passage, Simmel recounts other moments of the suppression of speech. He notes that favors are given to the rich and adds that "these favors are given, without that the poor would even be justified to complain about factually being taken advantage of."
15 In this passage, Simmel attributes this added favoritism to a quality of the rich that he calls superadditum. People grant the rich more privileges and do not question their authority because they are rich. Simmel views the many possibilities that go along with wealth as the source of this superadditium: We respect the super rich because of some awe effect deriving from the near endless potentiality of their actions. However, while their potentiality gives the rich a special status, it is at first not quite clear how this should explain why the rich are above questioning.
To understand the end of questioning, one has to turn to Georg Simmel's overall account of the nature of desire and money. Simmel describes desire as a core relation that defines human beings. According to Simmel, desire spans the distance between subject and object. Desire can be described and measured as value. Money is the crystallization of this value, the desire someone has for an object. Money objectifies the gap of desire between subject and object, and, this is the crux, thereby makes it possible to overcome the gap. By paying with money, one can free oneself from a desire. Buying and consuming rid the individual of his or her desires and thereby from his or her dependencies on others. Economic trade is attractive because of this promise of freeing oneself from the claws of desire.
Simmel finds the model of freeing oneself in prostitution:
By paying with money, one is completely finished and done with every matter, as finished with the prostitute, after one's satisfaction.
Only the transaction with money has the character of a momentary extinguishing [disappearing] relationship, that leaves no traces, as it is common in prostitution.
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Prostitution is the perfect model for the money relation, according to Simmel, since there is not any expectation of a lasting relationship in this most intimate contact (neither for the sex worker nor the customer). The human side of the individual is not involved in the acts of prostitution. In fact, it is the very human side of desire that is actively dissolved in prostitution along with all consequences and all lasting bonds. Above all, this means that the individual (the customer, but also the sex worker) frees himself or herself from his personality, his desire, his body and being. The exchange by means of money is the catharsis of human relationship, both its highpoint and the washing off of desire, body, and sensuality. For this new and emerging structure of personality, beyond desire, body and being, Simmel uses the term "nomad." The individual becomes a nomad without a clear identity or lasting home.
And here we come to an answer to our question. After a monetary deal has been made, there is nothing that remains. No love and no question can reach the customer or the sex worker. The deal is done and disappears.
moNey aNd The RheToRIc of closINg QuesTIoNs
Money starts and ends relations. Nothing remains. If money is a medium of communication, than the rhetoric of money is about ending that communication.
The prostitute who needs to sell her body due to her poverty or because she chooses to do so cannot make any lasting demand on her suitor. If you pay, no questions can be asked after the trade, assuming only that the money was real.
In the same way, the person who sold his estate or beloved commodity 16 Here is the full context of the quote in the original : "[…] für den käuflichen Genuß, der jede über den Augenblick und über den ausschließlich sinnlichen Trieb hinausgehende Beziehung ablehnt, leistet das Geld, das sich mit seiner Hingabe absolut von der Persönlichkeit löst und jede weitere Konsequenz am gründlichsten abschneidet, den sachlich und symbolisch vollkommnensten Dienst-indem man mit Geld bezahlt hat, ist man mit jeder Sache am gründlichsten fertig, so gründlich, wie mit der Prostituierten nach erlangter Befriedigung" (514); "Nur die Transaktion um Geld trägt jenen Charakter einer ganz momentan verlöschenden Beziehung, die keine Spuren hinterläßt, wie er der Prostitution eigen ist" (513).
cannot demand it back after selling it. The people who sold off their land cannot demand it back. The people who give their work for money cannot turn around to ask for more after they have been paid. A trade is a trade. Rich people own more because they paid and continue to pay. Each trade is an equal trade since both sides agree. Even in bad deals, both agree to make it. "Take it or leave it." Hence, in most cases no one can come back to the deal afterwards, unless there was fraud involved or some coercion, even if information was distributed unevenly. Simmel's dictum "By paying with money, one is completely finished and done with every matter" ("indem man mit Geld bezahlt hat, ist man mit jeder Sache am gründlichsten fertig") applies. Neither the buyer nor the seller, the sex worker nor the suitor can demand more after the deal by asking for a lasting relationship with true love.
So what about third parties? Luhmann's question includes those who are excluded and are not part of the deal. Why do they not speak up and instead tacitly accept the deal? My suggestion here is simple. There are no third-party observers. The clean and equal deal makes them invisible. Each deal is an equal deal, there is not much to observe, and "no traces" are left, as Simmel states. And no question can be asked after the deal is completed. It is done, nothing remains. Of course, the deal is not invisible. In fact, many deals of the rich are quite obvious and covered by the media. But what is invisible is the angle from which a third-party could comment on it since nothing has happened. Two parties agreed to a deal that must have looked equal to them. Or put in terms of marginalism: both sides must have accepted the deal as better than not making the deal.
Luhmann's blind spot is the possibility that there are no third-party observers, since for Luhmann everything is observation. And there are no traces, no continuations that can easily be evoked.
Hence, here is the answer to our question why we, the people, tend to accept inequality. There is no act of becoming unequal that we can easily observe and object to. Trades with money are equal exchanges that leave little trace. Afterwards, there is not much to observe and condemn.
17 This is different from most matters of social inequality since there are no acts that bring about social inequality that both sides simply agree to and thereby sanction.
Money is a medium that establishes immunity. It excludes the owner from the community and from having to answer questions. The rich individual is in this sense immune, alone, and outside of the system. So is the poor.
foRgIvINg deBT
At this point, we can invert the argument above the ending quality of monetary relations by inquiring about the opposite case: why is it so hard to forgive a debt? In fact, there is an argument to be made that it is much harder to forgive a debt than make a gift. This is a question about the current situation between Greece and its creditors, but is a much larger issue between the industrialized and the industrializing world. It is also a question about the affect of debt.
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Usually in financial transactions the contact is a one-time deal. A contract is made and the goods are exchanged. Even in a loan, the deal is a one-time deal. One side provides funds; the other will pay it back at a certain time. The return of the money is a secondary act. All uncertainty of later payments is factored in via higher rates and insurances. Risks can be calculated, traded, and exported and thereby factored into the original exchange. Now, in certain cases, different things can happen. Let's take the case of Greece. In the following I will not be concerned with economic wisdom, but rather with the symbolical positions of the negotiations, independently of who is right or wrong.
The Greek government negotiated a favorable loan from several institutions. These institutions saw their agreeing to the terms as an act of good will, given that the loan return would be below market value (with a low interest rate). From their position, it was a one-time act of solidarity with the struggling Greek government. Now the prospect emerged that Greece may default on the loan or may be unwilling or unable to return the money. In 2015 (while I write these words) the Greeks, but also the International Monetary Fund and others, make the suggestion of a forgiving of the debt.
The formerly free act by the lenders now turns into something different: coercion. The lender is now not free and has to make a decision that is wrong either way. Donating the money, that is forgiving what has been given, would mean to be coerced, tricked.
Not forgiving the money means that the prior act of loyalty (the first giving) now appears to be an act without love. Greece can point to the fact that money was given as a sign of loyalty and that is symbolically love-so where is the love now? In analogy to Simmel's language above, we could say the lender is suddenly placed in the role of the suitor who once claimed that there was love involved, but really only wanted a quick-and-dirty, one-time deal and to be done. So the borrower appears to be the victim of the tale of friendship and love, prostituted by the lending institutions. The nomad, the free lender, is forced into a shotgun marriage. "He" can run away, demand his money, and show his ugly face in the act of prostitution, or he can agree to a potentially exploitative relation.
Neither alternative is attractive for the lender. Hence, the lender reacts in turmoil, with anger, since the borrower set him up for this showdown of bad alternatives.
Forgiving debt is less than a gift. At best, it retrospectively confirms that the first act of lending was already a gift. In that case, it is as if forgiving debt were nothing, it already happened. But in other cases, it compromises the lender. Asking for the forgiveness of debt, as justified as it may be in a global economy full of inequality, thus creates emotions of disgust. Even in cases where the lender can theoretically forgive the debts (as is the case with many of the loans that pin the Northern countries against Southern industrializing nations) the rhetoric of money makes this effectively and affectively highly unlikely.
The eNd of a QuesTIoN
Coming full circle, why do we tolerate economic inequality? Because the monetary exchanges that establish wealth should free both sides of a deal from future obligations. Paying money means one is done with something, beyond question. Money makes one immune. If someone wants to call equality into question and to bring back obligations, long-term relationships, solidarity, and love, we-the people-react with disgust.
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